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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
POSTTRIAL JUROR INTERVIEWS BY THE PRESS: THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
In a series of cases culminating with Haeberle v. Texas International
Airlines,I the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined the scope of the
press' first amendment2 right to posttrial juror interviews. This definition
involves a delicate balance between the sixth amendment guarantee of a
fair trial' and the first amendment protection of a free press.4 Judges
may restrict the time and place of juror interviews5 but cannot forbid
such contact altogether.6
In 1982, in In re Express-News Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit struck down a
local court rule8 that prohibited postverdict juror interviews except upon
1. 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The sixth amendment states in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, -
by an impartial jury. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend VI.
4. Federal courts have consistently held that the first amendment does not guarantee the press
access to information beyond that available to the public. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)
(upheld government's refusal to validate passports of tourists desiring to visit Cuba). The Fifth
Circuit, in In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982), approved of the line of cases that
gives the press a right of access equal to that of the general public. Id. at 809-10.
Tension between the first and sixth amendments has arisen in a variety of contexts. For example,
a number of federal districts have local court rules which prohibit the taking of photographs in, or in
the immediate vicinity of, the courtroom. See. eg., N.D. TEX. R. 14.3; D. Wyo. R. 19; cf. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 53 (prohibits taking of photographs during judicial proceedings).
The validity of these rules generally has turned on the facts. Compare Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 550-52 (1965) (5-4 decision) (televised recording of criminal proceedings violated defendant's
right to due process when defendant was well known and had national notoriety) with Dorfman v.
Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 1970) (district court rule prohibiting photography anywhere
in courthouse or federal building and on surrounding plaza and sidewalks violated news media's first
amendment rights).
5. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
7. 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
8. The rule provided as follows:
No attorney or any party to an action or any other person shall himself or through any
investigator or other person acting for him interview, examine or question any juror, rela-
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a showing of "good cause." 9 The court held that the rule, insofar as it
impinged on the press' right to gather news, 10 was overly broad. I I Judge
Rubin, writing for the court, distinguished the line of authority forbid-
ding litigants and their attorneys from questioning jurors. Litigants typi-
cally sought juror interviews to obtain evidence of misconduct,12 while
tive, friend or associate thereof either during the pendency of the trial or with respect to the
deliberations or verdict of the jury in any action except on leave of court granted upon
good cause shown.
W.D. TEx. R. 500-2 (emphasis added). The rule was rescinded in 1983. TEXAS RULES OF COURT
736 (1984).
In 1976, the news media launched a similar challenge to the constitutional validity of rule 500-2,
which was then rule 20. The Fifth Circuit denied the petitioners' application for a writ of manda.
mus. In re Iris Reed, No. 76-3009 (5th Cir. 1976) (mem.), noted in Brief for Respondent and the
United States at 5 n.1, In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
Six other districts have court rules that prohibit questioning of jurors by nonparties. See D.
CONN. R. 12(f); E.D. LA. R. 14.5; M.D. LA. R. 16(A)(5); W.D. LA. R. 16; D.N.J.R. 19(B); N.D.
OKLA. R. 8. The Louisiana districts lie within the fifth circuit.
9. Prior to Express-News, a number of district courts had held that judges cannot insulate
discharged jurors from the news media. See United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1145
(N.D. Ind. 1982); Ohio ex rel. Beacon Journal v. McMonagle, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1927, 1927
(Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Barnes v. Schwartz, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1648, 1650 (S.D. Fla. 1980)
(order).
In United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated a district court order that forbade discharged jurors from discussing a case with the news
media. Id. at 1361. The appellate court held that the threat of jury harassment posed no "clear and
present danger." The court reasoned that because the trial had ended, interrogation of the jurors did
not affect the defendants' ability to obtain a fair trial. Id.
10. In Branzburg v. Hayes, the United States Supreme Court extended first amendment protec-
tion to newsgatherers. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (dictum).
11. 695 F.2d at 810, 811. The court of appeals' analysis resembles the judicial doctrine of
"overbreadth." The overbreadth approach considers the effect of the law on parties not then before
the court. If the law would be unconstitutional as applied to these litigants, it is facially invalid. The
Supreme Court used the following language to define the doctrine in NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288 (1964): "[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
...regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby in-
vade the area of protected freedoms." Id. at 307. Similarly, the court of appeals in Express-News
stated: "A court may not impose a restraint that sweeps so broadly and then require those who
would speak freely to justify special treatment by carrying the burden of showing good cause." 695
F.2d at 810.
Two aspects of the overbreadth technique distinguish it from the Express-News analysis. First, the
Fifth Circuit analyzed the constitutional validity of rule 500-2 solely in terms of its applicability to
the challengers then before the court, whereas the "overbreadth cases" would have considered the
effect of the rule on other potential interviewers. Second, the Fifth Circuit left rule 500-2 intact. See,
e.g., United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 753-55 (5th Cir. 1983) (upheld denial of defendant's
motion to interview jurors on basis of rule 500-2). In contrast, courts employing an overbreadth
approach would have invalidated rule 500-2 in its entirety. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1186-87 (10th ed. 1980) (discusses the distinctive features
of the overbreadth technique).
12. See, eg., United States v. Riley, 544 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussed infra note 27), cert.
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Express-News' proposed interviews, which were intended solely for in-
formational purposes, did not threaten the finality of the verdict.13
In Express-News, the court engaged in strict scrutiny, requiring a
"compelling state interest" and a rule "narrowly tailored to prevent a
threat to the administration of justice."'14 Although the court suggested
that the sixth amendment right to a fair trial is a compelling state inter-
est,' 5 it held that the rule failed the second prong of the test because it
was over-inclusive. t6 The rule restricted the news media even when the
jurors would otherwise be "willing and anxious to speak."' 7
The court, however, left open the possibility that it would uphold a
denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977). Riley is in accord with decisions from other circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 1048 (1975).
Organized bar groups generally permit postverdict interviews for the purpose of impeaching a
verdict. For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility approves of juror interviews:
After the trial, communication by a lawyer with jurors is permitted so long as he refrains
from asking questions or making comments that tend to harass or embarrass the juror or to
influence actions of the juror in future cases. Were a lawyer to be prohibited from commu-
nicating after trial with a juror, he could not ascertain if the verdict might be subject to
legal challenge, in which event the invalidity of a verdict might go undetected. When an
extrajudicial communication by a lawyer with a juror is permitted by law, it should be
made considerately and with deference to the personal feelings of the juror.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-29 (1981); accord American College of
Trial Lawyers, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT § 19(c) (1972) (counsel has right to interview discharged
jurors when permitted by law); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
319 (1967) (attorney may interview discharged jurors to impeach verdict); cf. North Carolina
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Op. 337 (1983) (lawyer may interview jurors for
purpose of improving his trial techniques).
Judges, however, typically adopt a strict position. See, eg., Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739,
745-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948); United States v. Balistrieri, 577 F. Supp. 1532,
1549, 1550-51 (E.D. Wis. 1984). In Rakes, Judge Prettyman stated:
If jurors are conscious that they will be subjected to interrogation or searching hostile
inquiry as to what occurred in the jury room and why, they are almost inescapably influ-
enced to some extent by that anticipated annoyance. The courts will not permit that poten-
tial influence to invade the jury room. He who makes studied inquiries ofjurors as to what
occurred there acts at his peril, lest he be held as acting in obstruction of the administration
of justice.
169 F.2d at 745-46.
13. 695 F.2d at 810. Arguably, publication of jurors' allegations of misconduct in the delibera-
tions may disturb the finality ofjudgments. As a practical matter, however, courts are unlikely to
admit reported interviews into evidence. See State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); see also United States v. Jaffe, 98 F. Supp. 191, 194 (D.D.C. 1951)
(newspaper articles generally inadmissible).
14. 695 F.2d at 810.
15. Id. at 809-10.
16. Id. at 810.
17. Id.
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less restrictive court rule, 8 particularly one that prevented discussion of
other jurors' votes.19 A year later, in United States v. Harrelson,2" the
Fifth Circuit approved a court order that prohibited "repeated requests
for interviews" with reluctant subjects21 and inquiry into the votes of
other jurors.22 The court found the order narrowly drawn to protect
against harassment of former jurors and to preserve the confidentiality of
jury deliberations.2 3  Limiting Express-News to the general proposition
that the press is entitled to some access to the jury,24 the court empha-
sized that trial judges have the discretion to limit such access pursuant to
their supervisory authority over the jury.25
Recently, in Haeberle v. Texas International Airlines,26 the Fifth Cir-
cuit again addressed Express-News in upholding a judicial prohibition
against juror interviews by litigants.27 In Haeberle the trial court entered
18. Id.
19. Id. at 811 ("We express no view concerning the validity of a rule narrowly tailored to
prevent the disclosure of the ballots of individual jurors or some other paramount value.").
20. 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 1117-18.
22. Id. at 1118.
23. Id. While the court order approved in Harrelson is more narrowly drawn than rule 500.2,
it is not the least restrictive alternative. For example, to promote juror privacy, a court could advise
jurors who felt harassed to seek a protective order. See Brief of Appellants-Petitioners at 21, United
States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 201
n.9, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 n.9 (1979) (quoting OFFICE OF JURY COMMISSIONER FOR MIDDLESEX
COUNTY, THE TRIAL JUROR'S HANDBOOK 20-21 (1978)) (notes that jurors are routinely advised not
to reveal the names of fellow jurors or course of deliberations). Similarly, a judge may require that
all interviews with jurors take place under his supervision. See United States v. Cauble, 532 F. Supp.
804, 808 (E.D. Tex. 1982). In Cauble, the court noted that "a district judge has the power, and
sometimes the duty, to order that all posttrial investigation ofjurors shall be under his supervision,"
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 202-03, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519-20 (1979) (trial judge can
supervise questioning of jurors by litigants and their counsel). The Harrelson court did not examine
less restrictive alternatives.
24. 713 F.2d at 1116, 1118.
25. Id. at 1118.
26. 739 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1984).
27. The Fifth Circuit had previously considered an analogous question in United States v.
Riley, 544 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977). In Riley, the defendant
requested the court's permission to interview the jurors, intending to elicit evidence of jury miscon-
duct. Id. at 241. The trial court denied the motion. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that an
attorney may interview jurors only if she makes a preliminary showing of prejudicial intrusion into
the deliberative process. Id. at 242; see also O'Rear v. Fruehauf Corp., 554 F.2d 1304, 1310 (5th Cir.
1977) (counsel's affidavits insufficient to show "illegal or prejudicial intrusion into the jury process").
Twenty-five federal districts have local court rules that prohibit litigants and counsel from inter-
viewing discharging jurors without leave of court. See M.D. ALA. R. 4; N.D. ALA. R. 10; S.D. ALA.
R. 12; D. ARIZ. R. 12(b); D. CONN. R. 12(0; D.D.C.R. 1-28(c); D. KAN. R. 23A; E.D. LA. R. 14.5;
M.D. LA. R. 16(A)(5); W.D. LA. R. 16; D. MD. R. 25A; N.D. MISS. R. G-3(2); S.D. MISS. R. 16(B);
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judgment against three limited partnerships in accordance with the jury's
responses to special interrogatories.28 Their attorney then sought leave
to interview the jurors to learn the reasons for their findings.29 The trial
judge denied this request.30
On appeal, the attorney challenged the denial on first amendment
grounds.3 Judge Rubin, writing for the court, rejected the claim.3 2 He
distinguished Express-News, noting that it turned on the public's "para-
mount" right to obtain information.33 The attorney in Haeberle sought
the information exclusively for her own benefit.34  The court conceded
that her interests were of some constitutional dimension, but held that
they were secondary to the state's interest in preserving jurors' privacy
and promoting the administration of justice.35
Haeberle represents a sound balance between the, first and sixth
amendments. This balance affords reporters a constitutional right to
gather information absent harassment or inquiry into the specific votes of
other jurors.
The court's refusal to endorse a blanket prohibition against juror inter-
views reconciles conflicting practical considerations to preserve the integ-
rity of the system. The availability of juror interviews ensures
accountability to the public.36 Prohibiting juror interviews would dimin-
E.D. Mo. R. 16(D); D.N.J.R. 19(B); S.D. OHIO R. 5.5; N.D. OKLA. R. 8; D.R.I.R. 22a(g)(3); W.D.
TENN. R. 19; E.D. TEX. R. 10(b)-(c); N.D. TEx. R. 8.2(d); W.D. WASH. R. CRIM. P. 47(b); N.D.
W. VA. R. 1-15; S.D. W. VA. R. 1-18; D. Wyo. R. 18(c).
The court rule for the Western District of Tennessee is typical:
No attorney, party or representative of either may interrogate a juror after the verdict
has been returned without prior approval of the Court. Approval of the Court shall be
sought only by an application made by counsel orally in open Court, or upon written
motion which states the grounds and the purpose of the interrogation.
If a post-verdict interrogation of one or more members of the jury should be approved,
the scope of the interrogation and other appropriate limitations upon the interrogation will
be determined by the judge prior to the interrogation.
W D. TENN. R. 19.
28. 739 F.2d at 1020.
29, Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1021.
32. Id. at 1022; see also Sixberry v. Buster, 88 F.R.D. 561, 562 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (denied attor-
ney's request to interview jurors based on desire to improve litigation skills). The bar has reached
conflicting views concerning the ethical propriety of Haeberle-type interviews. See authorities cited
supra note 12.
33. 739 F.2d at 1022.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889, 893 (1983).
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ish public confidence in jury verdicts.
Uncontrolled inquiry, however, would also undermine the integrity of
jury verdicts. Few persons would have confidence in a system that pro-
duces dubious results; however, exposure of every aspect of jury delibera-
tions would produce precisely that appearance, whether justified or not,
for factual findings are typically the products of compromise 7.3  Discus-
sion among jurors should take place in the jury room, not in the
newspapers.
38
Qualified protection of the deliberative process also promotes freedom
of thought.3 9 The notion of a thorough and relentless exchange of ideas
lies at the heart of the jury system.' The exposuie of jurors' words and
votes would strike the system at its roots. Equally important is the need
to protect jurors from harassment.41 As state-appointed participants in
the judicial process, jurors are entitled to some privacy.42
The Express-News-Harrelson-Haeberle balance accommodates these
concerns while according the press some constitutional protection. A
balancing test provides few bright lines, however, for the importance of
various interests will differ in every case. The Fifth Circuit wisely has
left such decisions with the superintendents of judicial proceedings-the
trial judges.
R.E.B.
37. See Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1187, 1195-97 (1979).
38. See Note, supra note 36, at 891.
39. A Senate subcommittee's treatment of jurors after the trial of presidential assailant John
Hinckley stands in stark contrast to the judiciary's traditional concern for the confidentiality of jury
deliberations. The Subcommittee on Criminal Law invited five of the jurors to testify about their
experience. Some of the senators openly denounced Hinckley's acquittal and inquired into the role
of certain jurors not then present. See The Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 18, S. 1106, S. 1558, S.
1995, S. 2572, S. S. 2658, and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 155-70 (1982).
40. See Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745.46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826
(1948).
41. See United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1983).
42. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 319 (1967). Opinion
319 states: "The task of being a good juror is not an easy one, and lawyers should not in their efforts
to represent clients do anything that will tend to make it more difficult to obtain qualified juror
[sic]." See also United States v. Balistrieri, 577 F. Supp. 1532, 1550 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (lawyer inter-
views have a "chilling effect on potential jurors").
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